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Abstract. This article challenges the dominant assumptions in the literature that cutting
social policy incurs voter wrath and that political parties can efficiently internalise electoral
fallout with blame avoidance strategies. Drawing on the diverse literature on the role of
partisanship in the period of permanent austerity, several partisan hypotheses on the rela-
tionship between social policy change and electoral outcomes are posited. The results indi-
cate that religious and liberal parties gain votes, and thereby are able to ‘claim credit’, for
retrenching social policy. None of the other coefficients for the effect of social policy cuts
reach significance, raising the question of whether parties excel at blame avoidance or the
public fails to place blame in the first place.
[F]rontal assaults on the welfare state carry tremendous electoral risks.
The contemporary politics of the welfare state is one of blame avoidance.
Governments confronting the electoral imperatives of modern democ-
racy will undertake retrenchment only when they discover ways to mini-
mize the political costs involved. But as I emphasize, such techniques are
hard to come by. (Pierson 1996: 177–178)
The current period of ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson 1998) necessitates cut-
backs in social policy, and a large literature traces the conditions under which
retrenchment of the welfare state will occur (see Starke 2006;Korpi 2003).The
question of why political actors retrench, however, is still underdeveloped in
the literature (Vis & Van Kersbergen 2007). More often than not, the act of
retrenching is discussed as inherently unpopular. In fact, an entire research
agenda which assumes that retrenchment will incur voter wrath and explores
how retrenching governments can avoid losing votes has developed out of the
blame avoidance hypothesis. At the same time, some political parties have
been shown to cut social entitlements more often than others (Allan & Scruggs
2004; Korpi & Palme 2003) – a finding that suggests that parties face different
incentives to retrench. This inconsistency between the assumption that
retrenchment is unpopular and evidence for partisan effects in retrenchment
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activity motivates our analysis. We theorise that governments, and particular
parties within the governing coalition, might not only lose but also win votes
for retrenching.As such, our analysis challenges both the notion that retrench-
ment is an unpopular policy choice for all party families as well as the pre-
sumed efficiency of blame avoidance policies.
By testing the electoral fates of retrenching governments, we gain leverage
on whether blame avoidance strategies fail and whether some parties, rather
than avoiding blame, indeed gain votes and are thereby able to ‘claim credit’
for retrenching social policy. The results offer a negative response to the first
question. Blame avoidance strategies, if employed, are largely successful.1 A
more novel finding, however, is that religious and liberal parties systematically
win votes for retrenchment. These findings suggest that retrenchment is a
popular policy choice for some voters and motivates a research agenda that
examines more carefully the voter base of political parties since the mid-1970s
as well as the particular explanatory logic for why some voters reward
retrenchment.
To begin, we review the blame avoidance literature and then integrate this
discussion into the debate on the partisan politics of retrenchment before
developing partisan hypotheses for the electoral costs of retrenchment. Then
we lay out the method, conduct the analysis and discuss the results. The final
section concludes.
Blame avoidance and partisan politics in the era of permanent austerity
Blame avoidance and the new politics of the welfare state
A starting point for the literature on welfare state retrenchment is the obser-
vation that the Golden Age of welfare capitalism is over. Per capita growth
rates in GDP, averaging roughly 4 per cent between 1950 and 1975 among
advanced industrialised countries, slowed to around 2 per cent as of 1990.High
unemployment drew heavily on government revenue due to higher demands
for social security payments. The spending capacity of households was there-
fore weakened at the same time that governments reached a limit in their
ability to finance social policy. A growing dependency ratio further under-
mined the fiscal underpinnings of the welfare state. Finally, since tax rates have
already reached quite high levels, securing the sustainability of the welfare
state hinged on reducing, if only on the margins, the generosity of existing
social benefits.
In the face of these diverse pressures, Pierson (1994, 1998) has spearheaded
the argument that welfare states will remain resilient to widespread retrench-
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ment.Together with institutional ‘stickiness’, the unpopularity of retrenchment
among voters should stall cutbacks in social policy.As Pierson elaborates, the
recipients of traditional social policies (e.g., pensions or sick pay) come to view
these benefits as well-earned rights. Further aggravating the problem, the costs
of retrenchment are concentrated on a well organised ‘welfare state constitu-
ency’, whereas the benefits from retrenchment are diffuse, spread among a
typically unorganised population, and distant, in the sense that rewards are
only realised in the future. As a result, the politics of welfare state retrench-
ment in the current period is distinct from the politics of expansion in the
Golden Age because it involves taking away (and not allotting new benefits)
from precisely those who have the power to inflict punishment. For scholars
within the ‘new politics’ perspective, the breadth and strength of the welfare
state constituency makes retrenchment an electorally costly endeavour.
Indeed, the assumption that retrenchment is costly constitutes a cornerstone of
this perspective.
The presumed unpopularity of cutting back the welfare state provoked a
discussion about how politicians could cope with the electoral costs of
retrenchment. In some cases, governments may decide to avoid cuts entirely
until the economic and/or political climate deteriorates sufficiently (Vis &Van
Kersbergen 2007). Governments that take on retrenchment, however, can
employ a number of ‘blame avoidance’ strategies to avoid being punished at
the polls.There are three existing classifications of blame avoidance strategies
(Hering 2008: 177) (see Table 1). Pal andWeaver (2003) develop a typology of
eleven techniques, categorised by whether they refer to the reform process, the
way policy makers communicate their reform, or the payoffs of reforms for
different welfare clienteles. Vis and Van Kersbergen (2007) relate these strat-
egies to the different types of welfare reform including recommodification
(increasing work incentives), cost containment (reducing expenditure) and
recalibration (reforming policy to address new social needs) (Pierson 2001).
Concentrating more explicitly on the consequences of retrenchment for
social policy recipients, Pierson (1994) offers three blame avoidance strategies:
obfuscation (lowering the visibility of reforms), division (restricting negative
consequences of reforms to certain segments of the voting population) and
compensation (side payments to losers of reforms). A study of 13 reforms in
Swedish transfer programmes in the 1990s provides evidence that obfuscating
reforms were pursued more often than others (Lindbom 2007). Though
empirical studies of ‘division’ do not exist, the Lindbom study theorises that
division strategies will work best in policy areas that already separate clients
(e.g., differentiated pension schemes) and where voters are egotropic, since
sociotropic voters would blame retrenching governments even if the cuts did
not affect them directly. Finally, references to ‘compensation’ as a strategy for
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pushing through painful reforms arise throughout the literature where
side payments are discussed as way to alleviate the harsh consequences of
retrenchment.
Hood (2002) creates a final typology. In his view, actors can alter their
reasoning concerning reform, the particular policies that make up the reform
or the institution responsible for implementing the reform. The last strategy
invokes the role of delegation and, by doing so,Hood illuminates the relevance
of blame avoidance strategies for the implementation stage. Taken together,
these three classifications represent ways in which retrenching governments
can protect themselves against voter backlash.
The blame avoidance literature provides a rich array of concepts with
which to analyse the retrenchment process.Nevertheless, the imperative to use
blame avoidance strategies as well as the success of these strategies is largely
taken for granted.We find this state of affairs unsatisfactory. In this worldview,
preferences over retrenchment are only allowed to exist in degrees of discon-
tent. No matter how skewed public opinion is in favour of the welfare state, we
know from surveys that a sizeable group of respondents wish to reduce gov-
ernment spending for social programmes (Boeri et al. 2001).Others are simply
agnostic to such changes.We therefore find it reasonable to consider instances
where voters will not blame parties for cutting back on social policy.Moreover,
if redistributive issues continue to shape electoral competition, as we believe
they do, then parties should rely to differing extents on welfare state support-
ers and face different pressures to enact blame avoidance strategies as a result.
Table 1. Typologies of blame avoidance
Source First type Second type Third type
Pal & Weaver
(2003)
Procedures
Insulation
Passing the Buck
Agenda Limitation
Perceptions
Obfuscation
Finding a Scapegoat
Circling the Wagons
Redefining the Issue
Payoffs
Dispersion
Compensation
Exemption
Concentration
Pierson (1994) Obfuscation
Decrementalism
Indirect Incidence
Burden Shifting
Automaticity
Lagged Cutbacks
Division
Targeting Policies
Compensation
Exempting
Constituencies
Offering other Benefits
Hood (2002) Presentation
Excuses
Justification
Policy
Selecting Policies
Agency
Delegation
Source: Hering (2008).
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Furthermore, blame avoidance strategies are often discussed as if they
had a neutralising effect: retrenchment incurs wrath; blame avoidance strat-
egies pre-empt or dissolve these negative feelings. We challenge this under-
standing in two ways. First, we believe that blame avoidance may not be
efficient in all cases and hence parties might lose votes after retrenching the
welfare state. For instance, it might not be realistic to assume that all gov-
ernments have full control over the political agenda and can successfully
enact blame avoidance strategies. Alternatively, economic constraints might
be so heavy that blame avoidance strategies are not an option due to the
sheer amount of retrenchment. Another line of reasoning highlights the fact
that blame avoidance strategies are themselves costly. Pierson (1994) was
rather critical, for instance, of compensation strategies since such actions may
defeat the original aim of retrenchment attempts – namely to lower the cost
of social policy.
Second, blame avoidance strategies may be so successful at addressing
voter discontent that retrenching parties win over new voters. Although
Pierson has a point that compensation strategies contradict the cost-saving
aspect of retrenchment, such strategies may be desirable when they contribute
to the realisation of the government’s policy agenda and appeal to their voters.
One can make precisely this argument with regard to ‘flexicurity’ reforms.
Certain social policies, such as long-term unemployment insurance, have been
shown to depress employment levels, whereas others, such as active labour
market policies, are related to higher levels of employment (Bradley &
Stephens 2007). ‘Flexicurity’ reforms typically include a policy mix that com-
bines retrenchment of employment-impeding policies with an expansion of
employment-friendly policies. Beyond addressing the economic costs of low
employment, such reforms may gain the support of marginalised workers by
improving their chances of finding stable jobs.Moreover, employment-friendly
policies are more abundant in countries with strong social democratic parties
and less abundant in countries with strong Christian democratic parties (Huo
et al. 2008), which suggests that the enactment of compensation strategies
follows a political logic.
In short, although the blame avoidance literature contributes much to the
understanding of retrenchment, the assumptions underlying this literature are
too strong. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that some
voters will tolerate or support retrenchment, and preferences over retrench-
ment should map onto partisanship, thereby making some parties rely on
blame avoidance strategies more than others. Moreover, blame avoidance
strategies are themselves not immune to pressures such as distributive com-
petition and implementation costs. These strategies should therefore hold
independent effects for electoral outcomes.
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Our critique of the blame avoidance literature suggests a more complex
relationship between cuts in social policy and electoral outcomes than cur-
rently exists. Given that some voters may support or tolerate retrenchment, it
becomes relevant to ask how these individuals vote and whether political
parties have access to this information. Since blame avoidance strategies are
also likely to have their own dynamics, it is necessary to consider how parties
balance the expected costs of retrenchment with both the expected benefits of
blame avoidance strategies as well as the likelihood that such strategies fail.
As a first cut at addressing these concerns, our analysis tests the null
hypothesis, derived from the blame avoidance literature, of an insignificant
relationship between social policy cuts and changes in electoral outcomes.
Going beyond this first hypothesis, we propose that political parties face dif-
ferent electoral costs for cutting social policy. To develop partisan hypotheses
for the electoral costs of retrenchment, we draw from the literature on the
partisan politics of retrenchment.
Partisan politics in the era of permanent austerity
Existing accounts of the role of partisanship in the realisation of the retrench-
ment agenda span the range of theoretical possibility.Whereas some claim that
partisanship has ceased to play a role, à la the ‘new politics’ perspective, others
counter that partisanship matters in much the same way that it did in the
period of expansion, and still another strand of the literature claims that
partisanship matters, although in a new way. Inconsistency in the existing
theoretical accounts of the role of partisanship can be traced to different
assumptions about which voters make up the constituencies of political parties
as well as how voters judge retrenching governments.We first review the four
main perspectives in the literature, including ‘new politics’, ‘old politics’,
‘market-liberalism’ and ‘Nixon goes to China’, before using them to build
partisan hypotheses for the electoral costs of retrenchment.
Those within the ‘new politics’ perspective tend to view the welfare state
constituency as encompassing broad segments of the population (Flora 1989)
so that all parties rely to some degree on these voters. Retrenchment is gen-
erally assessed as an unpopular policy choice for all political parties, at least to
some degree. To be sure, scholars working within this perspective recognise
that some governments want to retrench and succeed at doing so.As a case in
point, Pierson and Smith (1993: 500) note that conservatives ‘favor the rollback
of the welfare state in order to decrease the size and scope of government’.
They add however that, even for conservative parties, ‘cutbacks in social policy
were generally unpopular’ (Pierson & Smith 1993: 509).Therefore, the central
implication of a large welfare state constituency is that no party will dare place
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retrenchment squarely on its agenda and that retrenchment will only occur
when blame avoidance strategies are on hand to limit electoral fallout. Pro-
viding empirical support for this thesis are studies based on expenditure data
that reveal reduced partisan differences (Huber & Stephens 2001; Kittel &
Obinger 2003).A central claim of the ‘new politics’ literature is therefore that
partisanship ceases to matter in the period of retrenchment.
Not long after the ‘new politics’ perspective declared the end of partisan-
ship, contrary views arose that the ‘old politics’ were alive and well. This view
gained momentum particularly after social entitlement data, which allow one
to differentiate between the actual generosity of social benefits and the
number of individuals taking up these policies, became available. These data
revealed that parties of the right retrenched more often than parties of the left
(Allan & Scruggs 2004; Korpi & Palme, 2003). This finding clearly challenges
the assumption that class politics have lost relevance and lends support to
theories of welfare state expansion that illuminate the influence of left parties
and unions (Stephens 1979; Korpi 1983) as well as religious parties (Van
Kersbergen 1995; Huber et al. 1993) in fueling welfare state expansion. In
defence of traditional theories of partisanship, Korpi and Palme (2003: 428)
elaborate on why the current period is not particularly new:
[N]egativity bias and blame avoidance were of relevance also in the
expansion phase. This reflects the fact that reforms had to be paid for by
tax increases. Instead of a head-on confrontation for or against social
policy reform, in most Western countries the partisan political debate
came instead to focus on the ‘tradeoff’ between levels of taxation and
social reform.
Applying theories of expansion to the period of retrenchment implies a con-
tinuation in the electoral bases of the major political parties. Secular and
right-leaning parties will draw support from constituencies that favour lower
taxes, whereas left and religious parties rely on a voting base that supports
existing social benefits.We label this view the ‘old politics’ of the welfare state
since it challenges the ‘new politics’ perspective and relies on traditional
theories of welfare state expansion.
Despite rather strong support for this theory, the assumption of stable
constituencies is called into question by research that shows considerable
change in party systems since 1970 (Pennings & Lane 1998; Mair 1997). In
particular, assuming that traditional social policies continue to attract the same
voter base today as they did fifty years ago implies frozen political cleavages
and unwavering party allegiance. To the contrary, in most countries, new
parties have entered the scene, the values and preferences that define society
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have changed and new dimensions of political competition have emerged. Of
particular relevance is Kitschelt’s (1994) theory that a shift has taken place in
the nature of party competition, from a traditional left-right dimension to
a two-dimensional space defined by left-libertarianism and right-
authoritarianism. A number of voters are seen to have moved into the left-
libertarian quadrant of the policy space, which has increased the electoral
success of left-libertarian and market-liberal parties.
Moreover, Kitschelt argues that market-liberal parties should find it easier
to retrench.Although he concedes that welfare state popularity makes unhin-
dered retrenchment untenable, he nevertheless argues that these parties have
a particular capacity to enact cuts: ‘[U]p to a certain point of reform commit-
ment, market-liberals may still keep the opposition at bay because of its lack
of credibility and/or its inability to form an alliance that could displace the
market-liberal party’ (Kitschelt 2001: 276). Although he was more concerned
with the role of party competition rather than electoral competition, this
insight suggests that the voter base of liberal parties provides them with an
opportunity to cut social policy that would be unthinkable for other parties.
A final strand of the literature diverges strongly from the aforementioned
theories. Although never explicitly stated, the studies above see voters as
selecting the party whose policies make them better off in economic terms.
Ross (2000) spearheads the ‘Nixon goes to China’ perspective that sees voters
as choosing parties based on the role that parties historically played in devel-
oping social policy. Parties are thereby evaluated according to their legacy in
protecting the worst-off in society: parties that helped establish the welfare
state hold strong legitimacy for correcting social injustice, whereas ‘anti-
welfare’ parties do not. The former parties will therefore find it easier to
retrench than the latter. In a similar vein, Levy (1999) explains how govern-
ments, particularly those on the left, are able to turn ‘vice into virtue’ in
retrenching reforms.
As mentioned above, reconciling these theories with each other runs into
obstacles because they often make conflicting assumptions about the social
policy preferences of parties’ constituencies as well as about the criteria by
which retrenching governments are judged.The ‘new politics’ perspective sees
the welfare state constituency as encompassing broad segments of the voting
population, whereas the remaining theories do not go this far.The ‘old politics’
suggests that parties of the secular centre and the right rely on constituencies
that support retrenchment in order to secure lower taxes and the ‘Nixon goes
to China’ perspective builds implicitly off of this theory. For others, new
dynamics of political competition have given way to the rise of market-liberal
parties whose constituency is relatively tolerant of retrenchment. Finally,
whereas all of the theories assume self-interested voters, the ‘Nixon goes to
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China’ perspective sees voters evaluating retrenching governments in light of
their historic commitment to social justice.
These inconsistencies aside, we can use these perspectives to develop par-
tisan hypotheses for the electoral costs of retrenchment (Table 2). The litera-
ture reviewed above focuses largely on the question of which parties take on
the retrenchment agenda. In doing so, each theory invoked a story about the
role of voters.We draw on these accounts about how voters perceive retrench-
ment to hypothesise about how parties will do at the polls if they cut back the
welfare state. Since the literature goes beyond a left-right distinction, we use
the concept of ‘party families’ in order to fully address the different perspec-
tives. We now briefly review the hypotheses derived from the welfare state
literature on partisanship in the current period.
Partisan hypotheses for the electoral costs of retrenchment
The ‘new politics’ perspective predicts that all parties face voter resistance to
retrenchment. Since retrenchment is unpopular, parties will pursue retrench-
ment only if they can avoid losing votes for doing so. The ‘new politics’
hypothesis therefore predicts that no party will lose votes for retrenchment; at
the same time, since retrenchment is inherently unpopular, no party will win
votes either.
The last three hypotheses2 raise the point that partisan politics may not be
as immobilised as the ‘new politics’ would have one believe. Drawing on
traditional bases of electoral support, the ‘old politics’ perspective suggests
Table 2. Partisan hypotheses for the electoral costs of retrenchment
NEW POLITICS
According to the new politics hypothesis, parties will neither lose nor gain votes for
retrenching social policy because they will enact blame avoidance strategies to
counteract any electoral fallout.
OLD POLITICS
According to the old politics hypothesis, left and religious parties will lose votes for
retrenchment if their blame avoidance strategies fail, and liberal and conservative
parties will gain votes.
MARKET LIBERALISM
Market-liberal parties will exhibit a unique capacity to retrench without electoral losses,
whereas other parties will lose votes if their blame avoidance strategies fail.
NIXON GOES TO CHINA
Left and religious parties will win votes for retrenchment, whereas liberal and
conservative parties will lose votes if their blame avoidance strategies fail.
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that left and religious parties will face voter backlash for retrenching social
policy, whereas conservative and liberal parties, due to the preferences of their
voters for lower taxes and less government, will find support for retrenchment
among their constituency. With these priors, we might predict that only con-
servative and liberal parties will retrench. However, assuming for a moment
that parties cannot completely control the decision to retrench, left and reli-
gious parties may sometimes choose to retrench.This assumption is verified by
the data. We consequently argue that retrenchment is unpopular for left and
religious parties and leave it an open question whether their blame avoidance
strategies are successful. Therefore, we hypothesise that left and religious
parties that retrench will either lose votes or face no significant electoral costs
for retrenchment, whereas conservative and liberal parties that retrench are
expected to gain.
Although the ‘market liberal’ perspective shares the view that partisan
differences matter, the understanding of how partisanship matters follows a
different logic. Changes in the voting base of advanced welfare states produce
a new left-libertarian constituency that is relatively supportive of retrench-
ment.The group of parties considered as market-liberal overlaps considerably
with the liberal party family, and we therefore hypothesise that liberal parties
will gain from retrenchment because they are adept at attracting this new
political constituency and do not rely on support from other types of voters.
Other parties will lose votes for retrenchment if their blame avoidance strat-
egies fail because they rely on voters who will defend the welfare state.
Finally, the ‘Nixon goes to China’ hypothesis views the capacity of parties to
retrench as a result of their historical commitment to social justice. Therefore,
this hypothesis theorises that retrenchment by left and religious parties will be
rewarded by voters for protecting the long-term sustainability of the welfare
state, whereas conservative and liberal parties are hypothesised to incur voter
wrath for undermining social justice. These latter parties will therefore lose
votes if their blame avoidance strategies fail.
Our data constrain us in two ways. First, a reliance on electoral data is
limiting since the hypotheses ultimately rest on voter motivations. As such,
assessing exactly which theory holds more weight is not always possible since
some theories imply the same directional hypotheses. For example, both the
‘old politics’ and ‘market-liberal’ perspectives see liberal parties as holding
incentives to retrench. Without more data on the constituencies of different
parties and the motivations for voters to support retrenching governments we
cannot fully test the theoretical perspectives mentioned above. Nevertheless,
by developing hypotheses based on these perspectives, our analysis is able to
falsify some of the hypotheses that we set forth. Moreover, where more than
one theory is upheld, our findings contribute to the field by illuminating
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avenues for future research. A second limitation is the lack of a measure for
blame avoidance strategies.Without such a measure, we are unable to distin-
guish between voters’ preferences over retrenchment and the success with
which governments mitigate voter discontent. Both these points will be dis-
cussed in the conclusion.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study makes an important
contribution to the field. In particular, our analysis contributes to the existing
understanding of welfare state change in the current period by positing two
innovative hypotheses: first, we test the idea that blame avoidance strategies
might fail; second, we test whether, contrary to the dominant belief in the
literature, some parties may gain votes for welfare state retrenchment.This last
point also provokes a discussion of another missing element in the current
literature – namely partisan-specific hypotheses for the electoral costs of
retrenchment.
Setting the stage: The economic voting literature
Since our analysis shares a similar logic to many studies on economic voting,
we briefly review relevant works from this literature. There is a long tradition
of studies that analyse the relationship between government popularity and
macro-economic performance. The initial studies in the early 1970s (see Frey
& Schneider 1979; Kramer 1971) suggested that voters strongly respond to the
economic situation. This work basically connected changes in the aggregate
vote share of the government with macro-economic indicators such as growth
rates or inflation levels. The theory underlying these studies is the reward–
punishment hypothesis (Key 1966), which states that the electorate holds the
government responsible for past actions by voting for the incumbents when
they approve the past performance and throwing them out when they are not
pleased with their record in the last term. The reward–punishment argument
also underlies this study.We postulate that voters act retrospectively and base
their vote on past changes in the welfare state.The assumption of a retrospec-
tive voter has been justified theoretically (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981) and
demonstrated empirically (Lewis-Beck 1988; Kiewit 1983).
During more recent decades, the economic voting literature increasingly
has addressed the issue of partisanship. According to the clientele hypothesis
by Rattinger (1991) or Swank (1993), left parties gain from high unemploy-
ment no matter whether they are in government or not, whereas right parties
always gain from high inflation. Powell and Whitten (1993) argue along the
same line, but draw the opposite conclusion. In their salient goal hypothesis,
they claim that left governments are held responsible to a higher degree on
unemployment while right incumbents suffer more from high inflation.
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Carlsen (2000) finds more support for the clientele thesis for right parties; the
results for left parties are mixed. In this tradition, we assume that voters
respond to changes in the economy and the welfare state. Moreover, we posit
that the electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment are party-
specific and that voters set different standards when judging the past perfor-
mance of the incumbents.
The structure of the party system should also hold consequences for the
electoral fate of incumbent governments. First, the degree of party fraction-
alisation influences the capacity of the governing coalition to disperse respon-
sibility for reforms. If more parties participate in elections, more parties will
likely participate in the governing coalition, which makes it more difficult for
voters to identify which party is responsible for policy change. Further, more
‘fragmented party systems – identified by a large effective number of parties –
should make it more difficult for voters to identify a clear alternative to the
incumbent government’ (Anderson 2000: 155). Accordingly, we integrate a
control for the effective number of parties as measured by the Laakso/
Taagepera Index.
Data, methods and analysis
The hypotheses are tested with data from a sample of 18 advanced industria-
lised countries. Since the argument applies to mature welfare states,we include
the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom and United States.The dataset
covers the time period 1970–2002. The following model is used to test the
partisan effects of blame avoidance,
V B B L B C B R B C*R B U B G B E ,change 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7= + + + + ( ) + + + + ε (1)
where L is the lagged vote share, C is the change in social policy, R is a dummy
variable for retrenchment in social policy,U is unemployment,G is growth rate
and E is the effective number of parties.The key expression in this equation is
B4(C*R), which captures the extent of welfare state retrenchment.
The data on the dependent variable come from the Comparative Political
Data Set (CPDS I, Armingeon et al. 2008). The dependent variable measures
the change in vote share of the last party or coalition that was in government.
This can be expressed as, Vp,t – Vp, t-1, where the first term refers to the vote
share, V, of p, the party or parties in government at t-1, at electoral period t,
minus the vote share of the same party in the last election, election period t-1.
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We begin by looking at the effect of retrenchment on the composite change
in vote share for the coalition of parties that was in government before an
election. Then, we break down the composite score into party families to test
our partisan hypotheses (see Table 2). We identify four party families: left,
religious, conservatives and liberals. The categorisation follows Armingeon
et al. (2008). Previous vote share of the incumbent party/parties is included to
control for a possible swing that the government experienced in the previous
election. This is also common practice in the economic voting literature (e.g.,
Powell & Whitten 1993).
The key independent variables are derived from Lyle Scrugg’s Welfare
State Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs 2004). This dataset includes net replace-
ment rates for unemployment insurance, sickness insurance,minimum pension
and standard pension. To measure the effect of total welfare state change, we
construct an additive index of the four different policy areas. The idea is that
voters might react to the overall picture of welfare state change and do not
differentiate between the single schemes.While we do not expect large differ-
ences between the effects for sickness and unemployment replacement rates,
we still analyse them separately to allow for possible unobserved variation
between the schemes.We concentrate on these two schemes because changes
are implemented without a time lag (Allan & Scruggs 2004).
The database includes replacement rates for a single person and for a
family. From these variables, averaged yearly change measures are calculated,
and these values are then averaged over the incumbent term.3 Such a
measure has the advantage of capturing differences in the length of the
incumbent government, which means that we do not have to control for this
explicitly in the models. The number of cases for retrenchment, broken down
by the degree of retrenchment, is shown in Table 3, which shows a consider-
able number of instances where governments cut back the welfare state. This
becomes manifest in the high number of total retrenchment cases (73), as
well as in the relative numbers. Furthermore, it also becomes apparent that
not all parties cut equally often and we find considerable variation between
party families.
The three other control variables – unemployment, economic growth and
party fractionalisation – also come from CPDS I (Armingeon et al. 2008).The
first two control variables capture now well-established factors that influence
incumbent electoral success, with the argument being that the electorate
blames incumbent parties if the state of the economy is bad (see the vast
literature on economic voting, e.g., Anderson 2000; Lewis-Beck 1988; Nannes-
tad & Paldam 1994). Following Powell andWhitten (1993), economic growth is
measured as a change variable and unemployment rate is measured as an
average level. Both variables are averaged over the electoral cycle. Party
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fractionalisation is measured by the effective number of parties with the index
proposed by Laakso and Taagepera.
The models are estimated using linear regression because the dependent
variable is a metric variable measuring the difference in incumbent vote share.
The analysis includes robust cluster errors to control for possible within group
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the models are checked for multicollinearity and
the residuals have been inspected.We define ‘retrenchment’ as a cut of more
than 1 per cent for the aggregate measure and as a negative change for the
single social security schemes. Accordingly, dummies for retrenchment of
social policy are made at an a = -1 per cent threshold for changes in total social
policy and a = 0 cut point for unemployment and sickness insurance retrench-
ments, following the work of Armingeon and Giger (2008). Furthermore, with
these cut off points we ensure that only major cuts, and not random fluctua-
tions in the data, are taken into account. These cut off points are robust and
valid as they capture a sufficient number of observations for instances both of
expansion and of retrenchment (see also Table 3).
In line with the general ‘new politics’ literature we postulate that the effect
of welfare state change is different for expansion and retrenchment, and hence
we allow the effect to vary. The slopes for expansion and retrenchment are
allowed to differ with the inclusion of the dummy interaction term mentioned
above (the intervening variable being the cut off point). For the interpretation
of regression models with interactive variables, we need to remember that the
effect of one variable is conditional upon the level of another and it is not
possible to infer whether negative changes in the replacement rates have a
substantial effect on the incumbent vote share from the normal regression
table (Brambor et al. 2006). To provide a complete assessment, the marginal
effect of welfare state change for retrenchment cases is shown separately at the
end of the tables (conditional effect).
Analysis and discussion
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The former table reports the
findings for overall social policy retrenchment, and demonstrates that religious
and liberal parties systematically gained votes after they retrenched the
welfare state, as demonstrated by the coefficients in bold. For all other parties
we find no significant relation between their retrenchment activities and the
parties’ corresponding electoral outcomes. In Table 5 we display the findings
for the individual social security schemes (unemployment and sick pay). Here,
we find that liberal parties significantly gain from retrenching the welfare state
in the case of unemployment replacement rates, but not for cuts in sick pay.All
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other parties show no significant coefficients for the influence of retrenchment
or expansion.These results are consistent with those from Table 4: only liberal
parties seem to gain more from cuts in unemployment insurance than in sick
pay. The fact that health care belongs to the group of social security schemes
targeting security rather than equality (Pettersen 1995; Roller 1995) might
explain this finding, especially for the liberal constituency.
With regard to the remaining independent variables, the controls perform
as expected (if they reach significance at all): high previous vote shares tend to
be associated with lower vote shares in the current election; high unemploy-
ment rates hurt the incumbents while high growth rates make them gain votes.
The sign on the party fractionalisation coefficient is inconsistent, but the
results for this variable remain insignificant for the overwhelming majority of
the models.
Several sensitivity analyses have been performed to test the robustness of
the findings. If we restrict the sample to the period after the ‘sea change’
defined by Allan and Scruggs (2004), the results stay the same.4 Bootstrapping
the results did not lead to different conclusions from those presented in the
tables.
A number of insights can be drawn from these results. First, some parties,
contrary to the expectations of the ‘new politics’ hypothesis, appear to gain
votes from retrenching social policy. The results support the ‘Nixon goes to
China’ hypothesis for religious parties and both the ‘old politics’ and ‘market-
liberal’ hypotheses for liberal parties. However, concluding that the results
lend support to these theories begs the question of why some parties do not
behave according to the theoretical expectations. Specifically, why does the
‘Nixon goes to China’ hypothesis hold for religious parties, but not for left
parties?And why does the ‘old politics’ hypothesis hold for liberal parties, but
not for conservative parties?
With respect to the first question, consideration of the specific target groups
and type of retrenchment may provide some insight. Retrenchment may not
have hurt the electorate of religious parties that much, but rather more under-
privileged groups of the population from which left parties draw their support.
With regard to the second question, a closer look at specific cases suggests that
the ‘market-liberal’ hypothesis may be more valid. For instance, the Belgian
VLD under GuyVerhofstadt won votes in the 2003 election with a particularly
strong appeal to market-liberal voters. In this way, the ‘market-liberal’ hypoth-
esis may hold more weight than the ‘old politics’ hypothesis,which may explain
why conservative parties do not gain votes.
The analysis of the electoral consequences of retrenchment also offers new
insight into the blame avoidance literature.An important finding of our analy-
sis is that no party systematically loses votes for retrenching social policy.This
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© 2010 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2010 (European Consortium for Political Research)
result would seem to confirm the ‘new politics’ hypothesis that retrenchment is
related closely to attempts by the government to distance themselves from
dissenters of the reform. However, the subsequent finding that some parties
gain votes for retrenchment problematises the broadly held assumption that
retrenchment is inherently unpopular. As such, we can only conclude that if
voters are not supportive of welfare state retrenchment, parties are, in general,
very good at placating reform dissenters.At the same time, we have to keep in
mind that drastic cuts of social policy happened rather seldom. The history of
mature welfares states is still one of resilience more than of heavy retrench-
ment attempts. Especially drastic cuts are not frequently observed: only in
about 15 per cent of all retrenchment incidents do we observe a cut of more
than 5 per cent (see also Table 3).
Conclusion
The central argument of this article has been that the electoral consequences
of retrenchment differ according to party family and that some parties, rather
than avoiding blame, are able to claim credit for cutting social policy. In
particular, liberal and religious parties can win votes from retrenching the
welfare state. We explained these findings by developing theories from the
extant literature. The testing of these hypotheses was limited by our reliance
on electoral data: our data allow us to discern whether retrenching parties win
or lose votes, but not to get at which voters are supporting or punishing
retrenchment and the motivations for their behaviour. Nevertheless, our find-
ings make a large contribution to the question of why some political parties cut
social policy by demonstrating that there are indeed electoral gains at stake.
Our analysis has carved out many new paths for future research. By illu-
minating distinctions between party families that historically shared relatively
similar tendencies towards social policy creation, our analysis recommends the
party family variable for assessing the effect of partisanship on retrenchment.
Furthermore, since some parties gain votes for retrenching the welfare state, it
remains a pressing theoretical question whether retrenchment plays a role in
restructuring electoral competition so that some parties retrench in order to
appeal to new constituencies.
To understand why some parties win votes for cutting back the welfare
state more research is needed that examines the preferences of voters over
retrenchment, on the one hand, and how they identify with particular parties,
on the other. In generating hypotheses, we assumed rather stark distinctions
between the policy agendas of political parties, the allegiance of voters to
certain parties and the willingness of voters to punish or reward parties for
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retrenching. The results suggest that these assumptions do not all hold, which
motivates further research.
Moreover, future research should look more carefully atwhy voters reward
retrenchment. Do some voters actually prefer less social policy? Or are voters
responding to the implicit tax relief from retrenchment? Or indeed are voters
simply rewarding governments for being efficient by passing policy reforms or
having a good communication strategy? Recent research shows that retrench-
ment might not be as unpopular as presumed by the politics of retrenchment
literature (Giger forthcoming). Furthermore, the theoretical possibility that
fully informed voters do not blame incumbent governments for cutting social
policy cannot be disregarded. For instance, even welfare state supporters may
not care or may not punish (à la ‘Nixon in China’). Also, if other preferences
override social policy attitudes when deciding for whom to vote, the punish-
ment effect might be diminished. While research shows that media attention
increases the chance of losing votes after social policy cuts (Armingeon &
Giger 2008), it cannot be assumed that all types of governments or parties are
susceptible to slanderous media campaigns. Rather, it may be that media
campaigns are only used against governments or parties that stand to lose
something from heightened public awareness of the reform.
Finally, while our analysis suggests that some parties do not need to enact
blame avoidance strategies, we cannot disregard the possibility that such strat-
egies are widely used and influenced our findings.Most of the results are, after
all, insignificant. Understanding the role of blame avoidance calls for addi-
tional research into the conditions under which voters will indeed want to
punish retrenching governments.With such information, one could draw from
the rich literature on blame avoidance to examine when governments should,
and in fact do, use these strategies.
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Notes
1. We add ‘if employed’ to recognise that our analysis cannot control for blame avoidance
strategies. This means that we cannot measure the ‘true’ relationship between retrench-
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ment and voter backlash prior to the enactment of strategies by the government to
counteract the unpopularity of their actions. Empirically, this means that insignificant
results can indicate either that voters wanted to punish retrenchment but were somehow
deterred from doing so, or that they never had any intention of punishing retrenchment
in the first place.
2. Since blame avoidance strategies remain an omitted variable in our analysis, we must
consider the presence or absence of such policies in hypothesising the electoral fate of
retrenching parties. For parties that are hypothesised to face voter wrath for retrench-
ment, we suggest that these parties will ‘lose votes if blame avoidance strategies fail’. Of
course, blame avoidance strategies could also be so successful that parties win votes.
However, we do not think that such situations occur often, nor can we test this possibility
with our data.
3. If the government composition changed within one electoral cycle, only changes in the
replacement rates within the term of the incumbent government (i.e., the government
facing re-election) are taken into account. For further information on the exact coding,
please consult Armingeon & Giger (2008).
4. To restrict the sample makes sense insofar as the theory of ‘new politics’ predicts that the
electoral consequences of retrenchment became more severe in the period of permanent
austerity.
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